This paper tests for asymmetric information problems between the lead arranger and participants in a lending syndicate. One problem comes from adverse selection, whereby the lead has a private informational advantage over participants. A second problem comes from moral hazard, whereby the lead puts less effort in monitoring when it retains a smaller loan share. Applying an instrumental variables strategy using lending limits, borrower performance is improved by increasing the lead's share. The focus is on separating moral hazard from adverse selection and the results are consistently indicative of monitoring: First, the lead's share is more important for revocable credit lines than for fully funded term facilities. Second, a lead with greater liquidity risk reduces its share resulting in worse borrower performance, but its liquidity risk does not affect the quality of credits it chooses to syndicate in the first place. Third, covenants are paired with a higher lead share, and the sensitivity between share and borrower ex-post performance is greater on loans with more covenants.
Introduction
Financial innovations that have supported credit risk sharing markets have arguably helped make financial intermediaries better diversified and improved welfare. Reductions in committed capital and a greater flexibility in reallocating this limited capital are reflected in greater access to credit and lower financial transaction costs for borrowers (Rajan, 2005; IMF, 2006) .
But credit risk sharing results in asymmetric information problems between informed lenders and outside investors. One asymmetric information problem comes from hidden information via adverse selection. An informed lender has an incentive to offload loans that it privately knows are poor quality but that it may have nonetheless decided to originate. Reasons the lender may have originated such loans include private benefits and other incentives coming from cross-selling opportunities with the borrower, for example. A second asymmetric information problem comes from hidden action via moral hazard in effort. A lender with a lower portion of a loan will have a weaker incentive to carry out due diligence and monitor the borrower over time. To curb these problems, economic theory shows that the lender should invest its capital into the loan. In the case of adverse selection, this provides a credible and positive signal by an informed party to outsiders (Leland and Pyle, 1977) . Similarly in the case of moral hazard, this exposes the delegated monitor to losses if it fails to sufficiently monitor the borrower. The credibility the lender gains from retaining exposure to the borrower encourages other participants to provide funds, relying on the monitoring effort of the delegated agent (Diamond, 1984 ; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Holmström and Tirole, 1997).
To assess whether and how an informed lender or a delegated monitor can mitigate problems associated with asymmetric information, this paper examines the syndicated loan market. Syndicated loans are loans in which a group of two or more lenders extend credit to a borrower, governed by one loan contract. Syndicated lending shares properties of both traditional relationship lending and market-based lending. Borrowers repeatedly access the market and often engage the same lenders.
These "lead arrangers" -typically commercial or investment banks -are responsible for arranging the loan, taking a share, drafting an information memorandum, and inviting participant lenders. A priori, therefore, the lenders are not equally informed; and in practice, participant lenders also rely on the monitoring efforts of the lead arrangers after the loan is syndicated. The syndicated loan setup, therefore, lends itself to problems of information asymmetry. An additional advantage is that considerable variation exists in the exposure that a lead arranger has to a borrower and this information can be observed by the researcher. Moreover, firms of varying credit quality and information opacity access this market (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; S&P, 2006; Sufi, 2007) . And like other credit risk sharing markets, syndicated lending rapidly expanded before the financial crisis (e.g., loan issuance by U.S. borrowers reached close to $2 trillion in 2006 from $130 billion in 1987).
This study identifies evidence of asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan market, by relating a borrower's longer run performance after syndication to the lead arranger's share of the loan. The hypothesis is that when the lead retains a greater share, problems of information asymmetry are moderated and should be reflected in improved ex-post performance by the borrower. I follow a two-pronged empirical approach by controlling for a range of observable characteristics at the time of syndication and by applying an instrumental variables research design similar to Ivashina (2009) . 1 This approach is important because an unconditional correlation could be due to reverse causality, in that the lead arranger may hold more of a good quality loan, and it is publicly observed to be good quality at the time of syndication. At the same time, the correlation could go against identifying an asymmetric information effect if the lead holds more of a poor or opaque quality loan because it is forced to do so by participants concerned about shirking by the lead (as theoretically motivated by Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987, Holmström and Tirole, 1997 , and empirically supported by Sufi, 2007 , among others). Applying this approach, I find that the borrower's likelihood of subsequent default is reduced by the exposure of the lead arranger and the borrower's senior debt rating is more likely to be upgraded too.
A key aim of this study is to tease apart moral hazard from adverse selection. The collective evidence in this paper shows that moral hazard in monitoring is an empirically relevant problem.
The existing literature largely stops on evidence of information asymmetry, and lumps together adverse selection and moral hazard problems as possible explanations. 2 To cite a few, Dennis and 3 What does monitoring mean in practice? Monitoring in this paper encompasses both information updating as the lead lender learns about the borrower over time, and active policing through, for example, the option to renegotiate contracts as information about the borrower is uncovered. Theor-etical papers allow a malleable interpretation of monitoring. For example, in the view of Holmström and Tirole (1997), monitoring means the "inspection" of various aspects of the borrowing firm that include ongoing communication with management, determining the frequency of cash flow reviews, examining balance sheets and sales projections, and making sure that the borrower meets the covenants in its contract. Similarly, Fama (1985) discusses the periodic payment of "monitoring fees"
by firms for lines of credit (even if funds are not drawn) simply to provide a signal about their outside debt. Being inside debt, the bank lender is party to private information such as the borrower's deposit history with the bank. But monitoring can also mean active intervention into the business of the firm (Gorton and Winton, 2003) .
I, therefore, test for the lead's hidden action by taking advantage of variation in syndicated loans along three dimensions with hypothesized differences in the intensity of monitoring. The first dimension is the nature of the credit facility. More intensive monitoring is expected on facilities that are not fully funded when the loan is originated (credit lines) than on those that are (term loans).
Credit lines have been characterized as monitored liquidity insurance, where the lender retains revocation rights that are invoked when the borrower's cash-flow risk increases (Fama, 1985; 2009; Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez, 2012). The results in this paper are supportive of this monitoring view, in that increasing the lead's retained share on credit lines improves performance more than a similar increase on term loans.
The second dimension of syndicated loans that can be exploited is the liquidity and solvency risk of different lead lenders. These differences are expected to influence both the share the lead retains in its portfolio and the type of loans it syndicates in the first place. For example, a lead bank that has extended a lot of unused commitments is vulnerable to a liquidity shock if its borrowers decide to draw down these credit lines and other commitments. Therefore, it is hypothesized that lead banks at a greater risk of illiquidity retain smaller shares (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995) , resulting in the standard expected effect of worse borrower performance. This prediction is confirmed in the results of this paper. But in addition, a lead bank exposed to liquidity shocks is hypothesized to be more likely to sell or syndicate loans because it is forced to do so than because it privately knows that the loans are poor quality. In other words, if ex ante adverse selection were the salient problem, one expects that a lead bank with a low liquidity risk will be more likely to offload bad credits than a bank with a high liquidity risk. This paper does not find compelling support for this adverse selection alternative.
The third dimension along which syndicated loans vary is the extent of covenants included in the loan. Covenants are terms and conditions in the loan contract that are designed to mitigate agency problems at some future point in time. For example, Rauh and Sufi (2010) conclude that the "existence and enforcement of covenants are indicative of monitoring by creditors" (see also Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 2000; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Sufi, 2009 ). Covenants can serve as "tripwires" that increase the efficiency of a financial contract and the flexibility of renegotiating it. They can discipline the borrower whose aim is to avoid violating the covenant and transferring control 4 rights to the lender (Dichev and Skinner, 2002) . They can also enhance the lender's incentives to monitor in the first place, in order to accurately observe and demonstrate whether the covenant has been violated or not (Rajan and Winton, 1995) . The results in this paper show that loan covenants go together with a greater lead share and that the sensitivity of a borrower's longer run performance to the lead's instrumented share is indeed higher when a loan has more covenant constraints.
Why is it important to separate moral hazard and adverse selection? Both could be important sources of asymmetric information but each problem has different mechanisms that could facilitate market efficiency. The syndication process itself does not affect the extent of the adverse selection problem -whether the lead has an informational advantage over other syndicate participants about the innate riskiness of the borrower (and the lead signals quality by retaining a larger share at the close of the loan). In contrast, moral hazard in effort is endogenous to the process of syndication, as all lenders are initially unfamiliar with the borrower. If adverse selection is a more prominent problem, then one implication is to release more information on borrowers via credit registries, for example. Indeed, the introduction of credit ratings for loans can be understood as a market mechanism that evolved to reduce an adverse selection problem. While if moral hazard is a more severe problem, then in addition to minimum "skin in the game" requirements, enhanced covenants, and dynamic contracting schemes are recommended.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow: Sections 2 and 3 discuss the data and method applied. The results are laid out in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 offers some concluding thoughts.
Data
Data on individual syndicated loan facilities for U.S. corporate borrowers were collected from Loan Pricing Corporation's (LPC) Dealscan database (December 2008 extract from Dealscan's online LoanConnector service). LPC gets the majority of this data from loan agreements and commitments in filings with the SEC as well as from loan originators and other contacts within the credit market. Lenders have an interest in maintaining their rankings in LPC's league tables and therefore voluntarily report their loans, which are then confirmed. As noted in a number of previous studies, syndicated loans in Dealscan cover a majority of the value of commercial loans in the U.S. The unit of observation in Dealscan is a facility or a tranche. To accommodate the borrower's funding needs and to cater to different investors, a loan is often split into facilities. Nonetheless, as Sufi (2007) and others argue, the syndicated loan contract is drafted at the loan deal level. Therefore, the main analysis in this paper evaluates syndicated loan deals, although facility-level data are examined for several of the monitoring hypotheses.
Descriptive statistics on syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers are shown in Table 1 . Summary statistics are presented for the sample of loans issued in the period from 1990 to 2006, which coincides with the main regression sample (6,204 loans). 4 4 Because a number of variables such as previous relationships and lending limits are constructed using loan informa-
[TABLE 1]
Dealscan data are used to construct variables commonly applied in the literature such as the loan contract's size, interest spread, previous number of loans to the borrower, and measures of reciprocity and repeat interactions between the lead and participants, as well as the main instruments (Section 3.3 describes the instruments). The key variable of interest is the share retained by the lead arranger. The average share held by the lead is about 28% of the loan, with considerable variation (18% standard deviation). 5 The main dependent variable in the study is an indicator recording defaults by issuer, obtained from Moody's Default Risk Service Database (2008 extract). 6 Moody's issuer identifiers were cross-checked and hand-matched to Compustat. This led to 894 identifiable unique borrower defaults of the 1,200 U.S. issuers recording a default; 630 matched to syndicated borrowers in Dealscan. The Moody's default database was also used to calculate, as a control, measures of industry default probabilities based on outstanding bonds in a 2-digit industry transitioning into default status.
This paper focuses on a borrower's default because it is an unambiguous indicator of poor performance, as discussed by Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders (2003) . Indeed, from a creditor's point of view, the key borrower condition that matters for its payoff is whether the borrower defaults. Ideally, this measure of performance would be on a particular loan, as applied in Bord and Santos' (2011) assessment of CLO riskiness. However, their measure was based confidential bank examination data. Nonetheless, borrower and loan-specific defaults are highly correlated. For example, roughly 75% of issuers defaulting on bonds also default on other debt including loans, based on Moody's. This paper also evaluates an alternative measure of performance, which is the rating change on a borrower's senior debt (following Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2011).
The remaining controls are borrower and lender characteristics (where borrower characteristics are measures commonly used in the literature such as profitability, size, and leverage). 7 A rich set of lender characteristics is one distinct advantage of this study over existing studies that have focused tion over the previous three years, it makes sense to begin the sample in 1990. This allows information from the beginning of the Dealscan data set in 1987 to be captured. 2006 serves as a natural end to the sample -both because it precedes the 2007-2009 financial crisis and because it allows a sufficient window to observe borrower performance following syndication. 5 The sample of loans is confined to the sample with available lead share information as well as borrower characteristics (Compustat). As discussed by Ivashina (2009) , the lead's share is underreported in Dealscan (e.g., in 38% (36%) of her (my) sample conditional on the availability of the other variables). She shows, however, that no systematic bias exists in the characteristics of companies that enclose loan distributions and often the same borrower receives loans both with and without a reported lead share (roughly half of companies, which is also the case in my sample). There is evidence, however, of reporting bias by facility type. For example, the lead share is reported on 26%, 18%, and 7% of revolving line facilities, term loans A, and term loans B, respectively. The latter term loans (TLB) are allocated to institutional investors while TLA are typically allocated to banks. Therefore, following suggestions, TLB facilities are excluded from the consolidation of lead share information at the loan level, but not for the purpose of controlling for loan size (results are similar if TLBs are not excluded). 6 As noted in the Moody's documentation, these are not just bankruptcies but include strategic defaults on some securities like bonds (such as a distressed exchange or missed interest payments) but are not "technical defaults" due to covenant violations. 7 Dealscan data were matched to Compustat company identifiers and manually checked. I also benefited from the Dealscan-Compustat link data provided by Michael Roberts (Chava and Roberts, 2008 ). 6 on borrower characteristics. As a result, this paper can test whether the lead's choice over loans to syndicate and its choice over share to keep are determined by its opportunity cost of holding loans (relating to, for example, its liquidity position). Lenders were consolidated to the parent company, and in the event of mergers, the acquiring company inherited the relationships of the target, following Sufi (2007) and others. 8 The lender matching exercise ultimately led to roughly 3,000 unique parent company lenders (whether lead arranger or participant lender) over the full Dealscan sample. Considerably fewer served as lead arrangers (1,055 lenders). The top 100 lead arrangers represent most deals; in my sample they are on 93% of loans, similar to Sufi (2007) and others. Finally, data from balance sheet and income statements were included for the subset (a majority) of lead arrangers that can be matched to U.S. bank holding companies.
Method
This section describes the empirical method, which is to first test whether a borrower's outcome is improved by increasing the share of the syndicated loan held by its lead. Second and if so, is the information asymmetry an informational advantage that the lead has over other syndicate participants, or are all lenders equally uninformed about the borrower, so that the lead arranger has to exert effort to learn about the borrower (according to how the terms in the contract induce it to do so)?
The Benchmark Model
The benchmark specification -before attempting to distinguish the source of information asymmetry -estimated in this paper is the following:
where the coefficient of interest is , which is expected to be negative under the null of asymmetric information: the greater the lead's share on loan i to borrower j at time of syndication s, the less likely that the borrower will subsequently default. In an alternative formulation, the dependent variable is the rating change on a borrower's senior debt, in which case increasing the lead's share is expected to increase the likelihood of a rating upgrade and, likewise, decrease the likelihood of a rating downgrade. Controls include loan (contract and syndicate) characteristics, X i , borrower characteristics (including the borrower's industry characteristics), Y j , and syndication year dummies, Z s . Lead bank characteristics are also included in a model for loans arranged by U.S. banks.
The empirical implementation must overcome several potential problems. First, the possibility of reverse causality exists if a borrower that performs well in the future was publicly anticipated to do so by all lenders. In this case, the lead arranger could have passively chosen to keep a larger share of a high quality loan, having no informational advantage over participant lenders when the loan was closed. Thus, there is no adverse selection problem. Moreover, it would be wrong to attribute an unconditionally estimated relation to hidden action by the lead, as there is no moral hazard problem either. A second result that also would not be particularly interesting would be if the estimated correlation went in the opposite direction. That is, the lead arranger holds a greater portion of low quality loans because it is forced to do so by participants concerned about shirking and these loans perform poorly. In this case, any possible asymmetric information effect would be washed over by such a correlation. This issue is a concern because it is precisely what other studies find; lead arrangers hold a larger share of the loans to riskier and more opaque borrowers (e.g., Sufi, 2007 ). 9 The two endogeneity problems described should be collectively minimized by controlling for loan, borrower, and lender covariates. Arguably, however, there can be some known risk characteristics that are observable to participants but are not controlled for in the empirical specification because they are not observed by the researcher. The resulting endogeneity would be reflected in the coefficient on the lead arranger's share. To address this concern, the empirical strategy instruments the lead's share with variables that affect the lead's loan demand decision but are not correlated with the extent of asymmetric information in the syndicate in question. The instruments, described in detail later in Section 3.3, have a lender-specific loan limit interpretation. That is, considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity is found in internal risk limits of different lenders. Some banking organizations are more tolerant of a concentrated exposure to a borrower than other organizations.
Equation (1) is, therefore, estimated using linear IV and the results are compared to ordinary least squares. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, where the individual loan error terms are allowed to be correlated for all loans of the same borrower (i.e., clustered at the borrower level).
Hypothesis Development for Moral Hazard in Monitoring
A key aim of this study is to separate the source of information asymmetry in the syndicated loan market. Concrete evidence is sparse, even for other credit markets, because identifying the source of information asymmetry is not easy nor are the methods often generalizable. For example, one recent study runs a field experiment in a South African consumer credit setting to separate hidden information effects due to ex ante selection effects from hidden action effects due to moral hazard in effort induced by the loan contract terms (Karlan and Zinman, 2009 While this hypothesis has an easy monitoring interpretation, supportive results could be reconciled with an alternative adverse selection problem, although unlikely. For example, a correlation could exist between a bank's propensity to extend unused commitments and a particularly poor quality loan portfolio (privately known by the bank, albeit this is not evident theoretically nor in practice). The second part of the hypothesis, therefore, isolates a channel through which an adverse selection problem should be captured. Specifically, a bank with a high internal funding cost is likely to sell or syndicate loans precisely because it is more likely to be hit by a liquidity shock, for example. As a result, it will be forced to sell good loans and not only bad loans. This loan mix means that the quality of its syndicated loans will reflect that of the average borrower. In contrast, a bank with low internal funding costs is more likely to syndicate bad loans due to an adverse selection problem because it has less of a need to offload good loans. A similar idea occurs in Parlour and
Plantin (2008), where a pooling equilibrium (supporting a liquid loan market) is more likely to be sustained in the presence of adverse selection when liquidity and capital shocks are more frequent.
Therefore, the second part of the hypothesis is formalized as follows:
H2b:If adverse selection is a salient problem, then loans syndicated by a bank with a high internal funding cost should perform better than loans syndicated by a bank with a low internal funding cost.
Finally, the last hypothesis focuses on the dimension of loan covenants. As discussed in the introduction, a common view in the literature is that covenants are indicative of monitoring because they can help align the incentives of the borrower and lender, reducing agency problems that could cost of deviating and violating the covenant is higher for loans and other private debt than it is for public debt. The reason is because private debt is concentrated, while public debt is held by many dispersed creditors, making the cost of renegotiating and restructuring the contract lower for private loans. In fact, Rauh and Sufi (2010) show that low credit quality borrowers are more likely to take out both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants, reasoning that these firms cannot issue non-bank debt in the absence of a bank facility with tight covenants (see also Kahan and Tuckman (1993) and S&P (2006) for evidence of extensive and confidential disclosure requirements on private debt such as supplemental financial projections and quarterly compliance certificates).
The emphasis so far has been on the borrower's incentive. But theory also shows that covenants can increase the lender's incentive to monitor a loan in the first place (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 2000) . In this view, covenants provide the lender with an incentive to accurately gather information to observe whether a covenant has been violated or not. Without monitoring the borrower's condition based on information only available to the public at a cost, the bank would not be able to
later take action to demonstrate that the covenant has been violated. The loan's effective maturity is, therefore, contingent on monitoring by the lender. And in practice, participant lenders rely on the monitoring efforts of the lead arrangers. Rajan and Winton discuss how courts do not support a lender's claim to enforce a covenant if previous inaction implicitly meant that the covenant had been waived. To summarize, theory and evidence shows that covenants are tripwires helping to reduce the misalignment of borrower and lender incentives. Therefore, the third hypothesis is empirically formalized for syndicated lending as follows: 
The Instrumental Variables Approach
The main set of instruments for the lead's share are measures of the lead arranger's internal lending limits. Considerable variation in limits on lending to distinct borrowers exists across banks, indicative of differences in risk tolerance across organizations. These differences are expected to influence the loan demand decisions of different banks. In this way, lending limits have a lender-specific interpretation and can also be time-varying.
Regulatory limits constrain how concentrated a bank's exposure can be to any one borrower. I gathered evidence from SEC EDGAR filings from 1/1/2010 through 12/31/2010 to shed more light on internal limits (search terms included "internal lending limit", "internal limit", "house lending limit", or "house limit", and resulted in 52 non-duplicate bank holding company observations).
The upshot of this descriptive evidence was that internal lending limits vary considerably across financial institutions, but on average, the lending limit is half the regulatory one (consistent with Bromiley and Stansifer, 1994) . For example, measured as a fraction of the legal limit, the internal limit varied between 7% and 100%, with a mean (median) of 50%, and a standard deviation of 25%
(data available upon request). 10 As internal limits are not typically observed, I follow Ivashina (2009) in backing these out from the lead's previous syndicated loans. I use the 75th percentile dollar size of the lead's share on its loans in the previous three years in the Dealscan syndicated sample. Following Ivashina, the 75th percentile is merely meant to measure an upper threshold for the lender's risk tolerance and the instrument is also time-varying (robustness checks were carried out on other cutoffs, such as the 60th and 90th percentiles, and there do not appear to be discontinuities in the distribution of the dollar size of the lead's loans). I also construct a closely related instrument to help address a possible weak instrument issue, if for example, there is measurement error. The second instrument is the lending limit on loans where the lead arranger previously served as a participant lender, not as a lead arranger. As expected, these limits are smaller in magnitude but should also be positively correlated with the lead arranger's share on a loan because it is reasonable that internal lending limits govern the lender's share retained on its loans irrespective of whether the lender is the lead arranger or a participant. The results in the next section are robust to using only the lending-limitas-lead instrument. Finally, note that the lending limit instruments are robust to controlling for other bank characteristics, including lender size and solvency risk measures as shown in Section 5.2. 11
Lending limits also can be inferred from the lead's exposure in another market, that for mortgage securitizations and sales. Insofar as lending limits and credit risk exposure are determined by the internal organization of the lender, then its exposure to mortgage securitizations should be highly correlated with its retained share of a syndicated loan but not correlated with the error term of the borrower's performance. I construct this instrument for the subset of loans with a U.S. lead bank, as this information is reported in the regulatory filings of the bank holding company (Schedule HC-S).
The limitation with this instrument is that it is only available for loans arranged by U.S. banks and has only been reported since 2001. Therefore, this instrument is tested in an extension of the main results.
Information Asymmetry and Subsequent Borrower Performance

Benchmark Results
In the results shown in Table 2 , I examine the relation between the lead's share and the likelihood of future default by the borrower, estimating equation (1) . In addition to the variable of interest, common controls applied in the literature are in all regressions (see Section 2). The first column
shows the results of ordinary least squares. While the coefficient on the lead's share is negativein line with asymmetric information -the correlation is small and statistically insignificant. This is suggestive evidence that a possible asymmetric information effect (or a spurious link between observably good quality and a high lead share) may be offset by the lead being forced to keep a larger share of loans extended to weak borrowers.
[ The results of the benchmark instrumental variables regression identifying the conditional effect are shown in the next two columns. Tests of the endogenous regressor reveal that the null of exogeneity can be rejected, and the lead share should therefore be treated as endogenous. The first stage results are in column (2) followed by the results of the IV strategy in column (3). As discussed earlier, the two instruments are lending limits measured over loans on which the lead previously served as a lead arranger and over loans on which it previously served as a participant lender, respectively. The IV-estimated coefficient on the lead arranger's share of the loan is negative, larger in magnitude, and statistically significant, supporting asymmetric information in the syndicate. The estimated coefficient equals -0.164 (0.096 standard error) and implies that a one standard deviation increase in the lead arranger's share yields a 3% fall in the probability of default. 12 largely match those reported in De Servigny and Renault. I also constructed a simpler instrument, which is the share of loans originated by the lead in a borrower's 2-digit SIC industry, and found that this instrument is positively correlated with the lead's retained share too. These results, however, can be reconciled with a "local" advantage that a bank gains from focusing on a few sectors instead of diversifying into unfamiliar sectors (Winton, 1999) . 12 The results shown are conservative because loans in which the lead share was 100% are excluded. These are not bilateral loans, but are classified as syndicated loans that, in quite a few cases, include, for example, a credit line facility 13 Various tests of the instruments confirm that they are valid instruments. The lending limit measures enter positively and are jointly significant in explaining the lead's retained share, consistent with their economic interpretation and Ivashina (2009). The variables also meet the conditions for suitable instruments: they should be neither weak instruments nor correlated with the error term.
First, they are well correlated with the endogenous variable; the F-statistic for the joint significance of the coefficients on the two instruments is equal to 90.2, well above the value of ten, which has become a benchmark for whether weak instruments can cause a bias problem in the second stage estimates (see for example, Stock and Yogo, 2005) . Second, the instruments are exogenous. Because there is more than one instrument, overidentifying restrictions can be tested. The p-values on the test statistics are about 0.85, consistent with the null that the instruments and the model are correctly specified.
The remaining variables in the first stage regression are correlated with the lead arranger's share in many ways previously documented in the syndicate structure literature (e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009 ). Therefore, this discussion will be very brief. For example, the lead's share is decreasing in the loan's size and maturity. If the lead arranger previously served as a lead, then it holds a lower portion (controlling for the number of loans previously syndicated by the borrower, which also enter negatively). 13 Higher reputational measures are also associated with a lower share, and these range from the lead's market share, to repeat interactions and reciprocity between the lead arranger and participants, to the syndicate lead being a commercial bank. 14 Returning to the second stage results, most controls enter with the expected sign. Borrowers that are ex ante riskier validate expectations at origination and experience more defaults (e.g., loans with higher interest rate spreads, low rated 15 and unrated borrowers, less profitable, and leveraged companies). To control for industry performance, borrowers in industries that later experience higher default rates are also more likely to default. Two reputational factors especially help mitigate defaults: lead arrangers as commercial banks and when the interaction between the lead arranger and a participant lender is a reciprocal one. The latter finding supports Cai (2009) . Recent stylized facts with 100% share and the loan may then be split for the other facilities. In other syndicated loans, the leads may have split the loan between themselves. The significance levels are stronger when these loans are not excluded from the analysis. For example, the result in Table 2 (3) is significant at the 5% level when the regression is conducted on the sample without exclusions. 13 As Sufi (2007) points out, this finding is compatible with a moral hazard problem, where the information asymmetry is shared by all lenders, not an adverse selection problem. That is, as the lead monitors the loan and learns about the borrower, the information asymmetry is reduced and the lead can form a more diffuse syndicate. In contrast, the adverse selection problem lies in an informational advantage that the lead has over the participants and participants would, therefore, require the lead to retain more as this advantage becomes more precise with repeated lender-borrower interactions.
14 In other results, loans with a guarantor or a sponsor, as well as loans with resale constraints are associated with a lower lead share but also a lower chance of default. For example, minimum resale constraints could help ensure that fewer lenders hold the loan in the presence of a secondary market. That said, evidence exists that lead arrangers retain their shares following origination (Ivashina and Sun, 2011) . 15 Fine ratings (19 dummies) are not shown in Table 2 in the interest of space, but the coefficient rankings are as expected. For example, borrowers rated BBB and below are significantly more likely to default than AAA-rated borrowers and in an increasing manner as the rating worsens.
14 support the former. For example the Shared National Credit review found that a disproportionate share of problem syndicated loans are held by nonbanks (consistent with both the lower reputations of these institutions and their inferior in-house credit assessment and monitoring capacities as discussed in Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, and S&P, 2006 ).
An alternative measure of performance is analyzed in Table A1 . These are dummy variables indicating rating changes on the borrower's senior debt over a one-year horizon following origination (qualitatively similar results are found for a two-year horizon but are less precisely estimated).
Specifically, fine letter ratings were converted into a numerical scale and borrowers are considered to be "downgraded" or "upgraded" when the numerical rating changes in the respective direction.
The loan-level results are shown in the first two columns. The effects are in the hypothesized direction, where for example, a one standard deviation increase in the lead's share raises the likelihood of an upgrade by 3.7%. Note that these regressions also control for the average rating change in the borrower's 2-digit industry over the comparable horizon.
Robustness Checks
Additional robustness tests were run on different measures of exposure taken by the lead and different instruments. The first column of Table A2 shows that the IV results are similar when the lead share in percent is replaced with a different measure of exposure -log of the loan's dollar amount kept by the lead. Columns (2)-(4) express the lead's exposure in the closest way to how regulatory (and internal) lending limits are determined in practice. That is, for the subset of loans arranged by a bank (and capital levels are available from Call Reports), the lead's exposure to the borrower is normalized by the bank's capital, and likewise for the instruments. Results are similar and significance levels are stronger. Finally, confirming the exogenous cross-lead variation in lending limit instruments, the results in column (5) replace the limit instruments with lead fixed effects. The estimated effect (-0.108) is smaller but comparable to the effect estimated in the benchmark model in Table 2(3) . Table A3 shows the results of specifications in which only the last loan received by a defaulting borrower is considered to be in default. In this way, the timing of default is closest to loan origination. The effect of the lead's share is negative, although smaller in magnitude than the benchmark results. The last column applies firm fixed effects to better isolate the lead's effect. Assuming that a valid source of exogenous variation has been identified in the lending limits (as shown in the previous results), firm fixed effects can be used to understand the timing of default. That is, a borrower is more likely to default in a particular year when for exogenous reasons the lead could not take a larger stake, and as a result, did not exert sufficient effort in monitoring the borrower. The results are consistent with this prior (the estimated coefficient on the lead's share in a model that includes firm fixed effects is -0.092; standard error 0.057).
Finally, as predicted by the theory, asymmetric information problems (both adverse selection and moral hazard) should be more acute for opaque borrowers. The results in Table A4 collectively support this prior. Increasing the lead's share is, for example, more critical for borrowers with leveraged loans, lower profitability and Altman z-scores, higher equity volatility, and borrowers that are in relatively less familiar industries, or that are not investment grade.
Tests of Moral Hazard in Monitoring
Testing the Monitoring Intensity of the Credit Facility
In this section, tests are carried out on the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.2 to help identify whether moral hazard in monitoring plays an important role in practice. Following Fama (1985) and others, the first hypothesis (H1) contends that one main aspect of monitoring is for the lender to maintain and manage credit line availability. Increasing the lead's share on a revocable credit facility should increase the lead's monitoring of the facility after it is first contracted (regardless of whether or not the borrower later draws down funds). As the lead discovers new information about the borrower -for example, whether the borrower has taken on too much liquidity risk -the lead has the option to revoke the facility or to reduce the available funds committed. Therefore, monitoring should be more valuable for credit lines than for term loans. To test this hypothesis, the analysis is evaluated at the facility-level instead of loan-level data used for the main results. Facilities are partitioned into two different samples, depending on whether the facility is a revolving credit line or a fully funded facility (term loan). Evaluating the sensitivity of performance to lead share within facility classes helps control for the possibility that there are other fundamental differences between borrowers in the two classes that may not be controlled for. The results are in the last two columns of Table 2 (default) and the last two columns of Table   3 (rating changes). As predicted, increasing the lead's share on a credit line produces significantly better borrower performance. In contrast, increasing the lead's share on a term facility is not associated with better performance. For example, the IV-estimated coefficient on the share in Table 2 is a statistically significant -0.216 in the case of credit lines and an insignificant -0.127 in the case of term loans. Similarly, Table A1 shows the results for rating upgrades and downgrades for credit lines (results for term facilities are weaker and are omitted in the interest of space). Increasing the lead's share on a credit line facility by one standard deviation is associated with a 5.7% increase in the likelihood of a rating upgrade (column (4)), higher than the effect found for the average loan (column (2)). Moral hazard in monitoring is a compelling explanation for these results. In contrast, if the lead possesses private information on the borrowing firm when the loan is closed, its share should be equally important for signaling this information -regardless of whether the loan is a term loan or a credit line.
One possible confounding issue is that there are more commercial banks than nonbanks on 
Testing the Lead's Opportunity Cost Hypothesis
This section tests the second hypothesis -the opportunity cost hypothesis (H2) -that relates monitoring and the incidence of adverse selection to the lead's opportunity cost of holding the loan against offloading it. To test this hypothesis, lead bank conditions are included with a particular focus on measures of a bank's internal funding costs. How a lending syndicate can be shaped by the condition of the lead arranger also contributes more generally to the extant literature that has largely focused on borrower drivers and ignored lender conditions. The first part of the hypothesis Empirically, I approximate the opportunity cost by the lead's capital constraint, by how likely the lead is to experience liquidity shocks (that is, if it holds a low share of liquid assets or if it has extended a lot of unused commitments that could be drawn down unexpectedly), and by its funding interest rates (deposit and wholesale) controlling for its loan rate. Lastly, a lead bank's size and profitability also control for measures of the lead's reputation. Bank measures are shown in Table 3 for the subset of loans arranged by a U.S. bank.
[TABLE 3]
The results of the first stage regression in column (1) of Table 3 (2005)). Second, a bank with a high unused commitments ratio also keeps less to alleviate its liquidity constraint. Although, banks with more liquid assets do not appear to retain more as would be predicted. This finding could be due to a reputational effect. Reputational reasons also show up in the result that large banks and more profitable banks retain smaller shares. Third, a bank with a high deposit rate (relative to its loan rate) also reduces its share held as predicted. 16 16 In a few specifications, a bank's wholesale interest rate has a significantly positive effect on the share held, counter Therefore, the collective evidence from the first stage regression supports hypothesis H2a, which predicts that increasing the internal funding cost of a lead bank causes it to decrease its share of a syndicated loan. Then in the second stage (column (2)), the instrumented decrease in the lead's share is associated with a higher probability of default. As discussed in Section 3.2, this finding has an intuitive monitoring explanation, in that a liquidity or capital constrained bank simply reduces its monitoring level (and hence the project's expected return) in response to its incentive-compatibility constraint. Participants and other investors are aware that the bank is monitoring less and, therefore, demand a higher return on their invested capital (as shown, for example, by Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Ivashina, 2009 ). Nonetheless, an adverse selection problem (however remote) cannot be perfectly ruled out if, for example, a bank vulnerable to a liquidity shock happens to be inclined to arrange syndicated loans that it privately knows are poor quality, leading it to retain a smaller share.
It is not evident why this would consistently be the case but such a correlation could be picked up in the results described.
A clear-cut strategy is outlined in the second part of the hypothesis (H2b). An adverse selection problem should result in the underperformance of loans syndicated by a bank with a low internal funding cost compared to those syndicated by a bank with a high internal funding cost. A bank with a low funding cost (such as a well-capitalized bank with a small share of unused commitments and low deposit rates) can afford to hold good loans in its portfolio. As a result, the average quality of its syndicated loans should be later revealed to have been poor if the adverse selection problem is a significant one as predicted in the model by Parlour and Plantin (2008) .
Therefore, the focus of this hypothesis is on the second stage results. The results in column (2) are not especially supportive of H2b. Only the coefficient on the unused commitments ratio (-0.055; standard error 0.067) is signed as predicted by an adverse selection problem. Interestingly, evidence of an adverse selection problem seems stronger when zooming in on credit lines in columns (3) and (4). For example, the coefficient estimate on unused commitments is -0.103 (standard error 0.067), meaning that a one standard deviation increase in a bank's unused commitments results in close to a 1% lower likelihood of default. This result makes sense because a bank's decision to offload loans will be especially sensitive to the liquidity risk inherent in the additional loan it syndicates. A bank that has a lot of outstanding credit lines and other commitments is predicted to syndicate out more good quality credit lines than good quality term loans that have inherently less liquidity risk.
Moreover, such a lead should keep a lower share of a new credit line compared with a typical new loan as predicted by H2a (e.g., the coefficient on unused commitments in the first stage regression in column (3) equals -0.071 standard error 0.029 compared with -0.057 standard error 0.030 in column (1)). To summarize, there exists possible evidence of a limited adverse selection problem in the case of credit line facilities (albeit this result in column (4) is not statistically significant at standard confidence levels). Results supportive of H2a add further weight, therefore, to a moral to the expected negative effect. This can be reconciled with an offsetting reputational effect, in that a bank facing funding problems in the federal funds and repo markets also is forced by participant lenders to retain a larger share. hazard in monitoring problem.
The final two columns of Table 3 show the results of a complementary IV estimation approach, where the lead arranger share is instrumented with the two lending limit instruments plus a new instrument, which is the lead bank's credit risk exposure in the mortgage securitization and sales market (only available from 2001). The sign on this instrument's coefficient is consistent with its economic motivation. Banks that retain a greater credit exposure to mortgage loan securitizations also retain a greater share of syndicated loans.
Testing Covenants as a Monitoring Mechanism
This section tests the third and final hypothesis, which contends that covenants act as tripwires providing the lender with a option to intervene and renegotiate loan terms. Equally, the borrower has a strong incentive to avoid violating the covenant and losing control rights, especially when its debt is privately held and concentrated. Thus, the syndicated loan market is a good testing ground for the theory summarized in Section 3.2. If covenants facilitate monitoring, defined broadly, then a stronger relation should exist between a lead's share and outcomes for loans with more covenant constraints (H3a).
The results in Table 4 are in the predicted direction. Panel A shows results for a covenant split according to contemporaneous covenants, while Panel B shows results for a covenant split according to covenants on a borrower's previous loans to account for the dynamic function of covenants.
[TABLE 4]
The results show that the lead's share has a stronger effect on subsequent default for loans with a financial covenant compared to those without (e.g., the coefficient estimate in column (1) is -0.197 standard error 0.090 versus -0.091 standard error 0.236 in column (2) for loans lacking a financial covenant). A similar statistically significant relation is found for borrowers whose previous loans had financial covenants. Similar results also hold when running a comparison according to the number of covenants in columns (3) and (4) (calculated, along with slack measures, following Drucker and Puri, 2009). A third measure of covenant constraints can be approximated by how much slack a borrower has on a particular covenant. For example, net worth covenant slack is measured as the difference between the borrower's actual net worth and the minimum level defined in the covenant and normalized by the borrower's assets. Increasing the lead's share on a loan with a tight covenant should be associated with better performance than a similar increase on a loan with a loose covenant. The results in columns (5) and (6) of Panel B fit the prediction (where covenant slack is measured from previous loans). Panel A indicates, however, that the effect is larger for loans with loose contemporaneous covenants, although having a concentrated lead exposure on such loans could help offset the direct negative effect that slack has on performance (column (6)).
These results are overall consistent with the literature's findings that covenants have significant effects in practice. Sufi (2009) shows that banks restrict credit line access following covenant viola-tions. For example, a cash-flow based financial violation is associated with up to a 25% decrease in the availability of lines of credit. Sufi cites this as evidence that covenants facilitate monitoring. 17 Other studies also analyze the state-contingent transfer of control rights to creditors. For example, Chava and Roberts (2008) find that a borrower's investment is reduced following a covenant violation. They also find that violations on loans with a single lender lead to a much larger investment decline compared with violations on loans with more diffuse syndicates. This finding is consistent with the lead arranger having a greater incentive to reassess and restructure its lending position when it is particularly exposed to the borrower.
A stylized fact is that private debt contains relatively more and tighter covenants than public debt does (Kahan and Tuckman, 1993) . Managers also make accounting choices to avoid violating these covenants (Dichev and Skinner, 2002) . Moreover, covenant usage increases more on bank debt than on bonds as the borrower's credit quality worsens (Rauh and Sufi, 2010) . Loans with more stringent covenants result in a higher recovery rate (upon default) for the lender, also consistent with covenants allaying value-reducing activities by shareholders (Zhang, 2010) . But covenant usage is also increased by the lender following a worse performance of its loan portfolio. Murfin (2010) rationalizes this finding by a lender updating its belief about its screening ability and, therefore, substituting stronger ex post monitoring through tighter covenants. The degree of covenant rigor is, however, endogenously chosen together with other loan terms, in particular, the lead's share. The null hypothesis (H3b) is that covenants should be paired with a higher share -whether to increase the delegated monitor's effort (Rajan and Winton, 1995) or to increase the borrower's cost of violation (Dichev and Skinner, 2002) . In both cases, incentives are weakened by increasing other claimants on the borrower. But an alternative hypothesis runs counter to H3b, which is that covenants substitute for delegated monitoring. For example, Drucker and Puri (2009) discuss how covenants can serve as a "public monitoring device". They show that loans with greater covenant restrictions facilitate loan sales, hypothesizing that dispersed investors can use them to benchmark a borrower's performance.
To test H3b, Table 6 models the relation between covenant constraints and the lead arranger's share. These models control for the business cycle and the borrower's previous covenant characteristics. All the standard covariates included in Table 2 are also controlled for. 18 Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results of ordinary least squares for the financial covenant indicator, the number of covenants, and the net worth covenant slack measure, respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) repeat the analysis with IV estimation (using the lending limit instruments) to isolate the exogenous impact of the lead's share on covenant design in the loan contract.
[ TABLE 6] The striking result is that the OLS relation between covenant intensity and lead exposure is a negative one but the IV-estimated relation is a positive one. That is, covenants appear to substitute for delegated monitoring but the true relation is one in which covenants go hand in hand with monitoring by the lead. The OLS effect is likely swamped by reverse causality -in that tighter covenants then allow the lead to retain a smaller share as participant lenders are persuaded to increase their exposure. The estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the lead arranger's share yields a 4.2% increase in the probability that the loan has a financial covenant (column (2)) compared with about a 0.1% decrease based on the least squares estimate (column (1)). Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the lead's share is associated with a 0.20 increase in the number of covenants (while the OLS results suggest a 0.08 decrease when comparing the results in columns (3) and (4)).
A similar, though weaker, direction is also present when looking at the slack in the net worth covenant. For example, the OLS result suggests that increasing the lead's share by one standard deviation can increase slack by 0.0067 while IV finds a much weaker insignificant effect. The covenant slack focus in the analysis has so far been on the net worth covenant because Drucker and Puri (2009) point out that it is associated with technical default and is also easier to measure. Other slack measures are more difficult to measure unambiguously because it is harder to determine the relevant leverage or cash flow values. Nonetheless, Table 7 presents additional results for covenants that are relatively easy to calculate (the tangible net worth covenant, the debt to tangible net worth covenant, and the interest coverage covenant). The results also support H3b, in that tighter covenants are contracted together with a larger lead share. 19 [ TABLE 7] Taken together, compelling evidence exists for the view that covenants and the lead's share are complements, which contrasts with Drucker and Puri (2009). They conclude that covenants substitute for delegated monitoring because loans that are sold have more restrictive covenants.
However, in the absence of an instrument for loan sales in their study, it is somewhat inconclusive.
It is possible also that loan sales in the secondary market and syndications in the primary market are significantly different even though they share common features (see Benmelech et al, 2011 ). This topic deserves further investigation. The implication of the results in this paper is that the lead's incentives cannot be separated from covenants. 20 
Conclusion
This study has uncovered evidence of asymmetric information in the syndicated loan market, in a manner consistent with the related theory. An important contribution of this study was showing that moral hazard in monitoring is a significant problem in practice (albeit without dismissing entirely the possibility of adverse selection).
While the adverse effects of credit sharing have taken center stage in this paper, this does not necessarily imply that credit risk sharing reduces welfare. Such markets provide a valuable form of insurance for lenders as they free up capital and enable credit expansion. The results in this paper showed that banks retain a lower portion of loans when the cost of holding loans in portfolio is high.
Moreover, firms whose loans are sold typically maintain lending relationships and have increased access to loans (Drucker and Puri, 2009 ). This finding helps explains why borrowers are willing to pay for the intermediary's asymmetric information problem in the form of higher loan interest rate spreads (Ivashina, 2009 ). In addition, the shift from relationship-based banking to arm's length finance is endogenous and has been facilitated by technical, regulatory, and institutional change The tension between insurance and incentives has yet to be resolved. We have to wait until the dust settles from foreclosed houses to appreciate what direction financial intermediation takes. 19 To the extent that the results are based on only straightforward covenants, the problem may be even greater in practice because, for example, not all future effort by the delegated monitor can be contracted on. That said, even relatively crude covenants require monitoring and make it possible to learn about the borrower's state without much costly effort, as discussed in Rajan and Winton (1995) . 20 In practice, both Rajan and Winton's take and Drucker and Puri's take are compatible. Some covenants can be publicly monitored at little or no cost, while other covenants may require more effort by a delegated monitor to observe whether a violation has occurred. For example, Diamond (1984) conjectures that contingent covenants are costly to monitor, such as determining that the borrower's working capital not fall below some level unless necessary for expansion of inventory.
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A paper by Cerasi and Rochet (2008) speaks to the optimal design of bank capital regulation in the presence of credit risk transfer activities. This diversification should allow banks to decrease their value-at-risk and with that their regulatory capital. But a decrease in regulatory capital fails to consider monitoring incentives. The optimal capital ratio should be increasing in the severity of the bank's moral hazard problem. (upgrade) indicate whether a borrower was downgraded (upgraded) over a 1-year horizon, based on S&P senior debt fine ratings. Lead lending limit, as lead is the 75th percentile of the dollar size of the lead's share on its syndicated loans over the preceding three years where it served as lead. Lead lending limit, as participant reflects its limit based on previous loans where it served as a participant only. Lead exposure to mortgage securitization reflects the maximum credit exposure from recourse and other credit enhancements as a share of 1-4 family residential loans securitized or sold averaged over previous 3 years taken from Y-9C bank regulatory reports. Lead share is the fraction of the loan retained by the lead arranger at origination. In the case of more than one lead arranger, the sum of the share is taken. Lead exposure measures the lead's dollar amount relative to the lead bank's capital. Number of lead arrangers is the number of lead arrangers on a loan, while total number of lenders also includes the number of other lenders in a lead or participant role. All-in-spread drawn is the interest margin paid over LIBOR. Loan amount is the total size of the loan (deal) amount in US$ millions. Maturity is the loan's tenor measured in months. Secured is a dummy equal to one if the loan is secured and zero otherwise. Number of tranches is the number of tranches (facilities) that make up a loan. Financial covenant is a dummy equal to one if the loan has financial covenants and zero otherwise. Number of covenants is the sum of the number of financial covenants and sweep covenants plus one if the loan has a dividend restriction, following Puri and Drucker (2009). Covenant slack net worth is defined as net worth -covenant minimum level divided by book assets, where accounting variables are from Compustat. Rated is a dummy equal to one if the borrower's senior debt was rated by S&P or Moody's at the close of the loan and zero otherwise. Profitability is EBITDA to total assets. Leverage is ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Size is the natural log of borrower's total assets. Industry default probability is the 2-digit industry default probability measured over the previous 3 years using data on bonds transitioning to default from Moody's DRS following De Servigny and Renault (2003) . Previous loans is the number of a borrower's previous syndicated loans. Previous lead is a dummy equal to one if the lead arranger(s) was a lead on a previous loan to the borrower. Lenders are aggregated to their parent company and inherit the characteristics of the parent as in Sufi (2007) . In the event of mergers between lenders, the acquiring firm inherits the relationships of the target firm at the merger completion date. Lead fraction banks is the fraction of the lead arrangers that are "banks" following Gatev and Strahan (2009) . Lead country US is a dummy equal to one if the lead arranger is a US lender. Lead market share is the syndicated market share of the lead arranger measured over the previous 3 years. Repeat interactions lead to participant is the number of links between the lead arranger and other members of the syndicate over the previous 3 years, scaled by the number of previous loans arranged by the lead. Reciprocal is a dummy equal to one if the lead arranger was a participant in a syndicate led by one of the participants. Lead bank characteristics, including size measured by the natural log of lead bank's assets at end of year, are for the subset of lenders that belong to U.S. bank holding companies. Income is net income before extraordinary items to total assets. Capital is the lead bank's book capital ratio. Liquidity is the lead bank's liquid assets to total assets, where liquid assets are cash, securities and net federal funds sold & repos. Unused commitments are measured as a share of total unused commitments and gross loans. Loan (deposit) interest rate are implicit rates measured by the interest on loans (deposits) divided by the quarterly-average balances of loans (deposits). Wholesale interest rate is the expense on federal funds purchased and repos sold to the quarterly averages of these balances. Industry default probability Industry default probability, lead 3 years
Lead country US Lead market share
This table reports results of four sets of regressions: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the borrower defaults in any year following the loan syndication on loans to U.S. borrowers originated between 1990 and 2006. The explanatory variable of interest is the lead arranger's retained loan share at syndication. See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first regression in column (1) is OLS, while the second regression in columns (2) and (3) is 2SLS, where the two instruments used in the first stage (column (2)) are proxies for the lead arranger's internal lending limit; these are backed out from previous syndicated loans of the lead, both when it served as a lead arranger and when it served as a participant. The results of the second stage are in column (3). The final two regressions in columns (4) and (5) are the second stage results for credit lines and term facilities, respectively (credit lines are facilities whose type is "Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.", "Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.", "364-Day Facility", or "Revolver/Term Loan"). The latter two regressions are at the facility-level (and the loan amount for these is the facility amount) while the first two regressions are at the loan deal-level. In addition to the characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, and the syndicate, all regressions include loan purpose dummies (corporate, acquisition, refinancing, and backup line), fine rating dummies (19 dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan from AA+ to CC and below), year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions also include the covariates in the baseline regression, Table 2 column (3), not shown in the interest of space but available upon request. The first regression in columns (1) and (2) uses the same instruments as in Table 2 (lending limits), but the regressions also include characteristics of the lead bank including reputational measures (such as size) and opportunity cost measures (such as the bank's capital to asset ratio and unused commitments). The second regression in columns (3) and (4) repeats the analysis for credit line facilities to assess whether the lead bank's characteristics have different effects on credit lines. The third specification in columns (5) and (6) adds a third instrument, which is the lead bank's credit exposure to residential mortgage securitizations. This variable is, however, only available in the Call Reports from 2001. In addition to the characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, the syndicate, and the lead bank, all regressions include loan purpose dummies (corporate, acquisition, refinancing, and backup line), fine rating dummies (19 dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan from AA+ to CC and below), year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Lead lending limit, as lead (1) and (2) present results distinguishing between loans with financial covenants and not. Columns (3) and (4) present results distinguishing between loans with a "high" number of covenants (above median number, which is 3 covenants) and loans with a "low" number of covenants. Columns (5) and (6) present results distinguishing between loans that have considerable slack on the net worth covenant and those loans without much slack. The latter are denoted as "tight" and the former are denoted "loose" (based on figures for median slack; see Table 1 for summary statistics). All regressions include the covariates in the baseline regression, Table 2 column (3). Also included in the regressions shown in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) This table reports how loan covenants on syndicated loans changed over time. "Financial covenant" is an indicator for whether the loan has at least one financial covenant. The number of covenants are measured following the approach in Drucker and Puri (2009) . Specifically, this is the sum of the total number of financial covenants and sweep covenants (asset, equity, debt) plus one if the loan has a dividend restriction. "Covenant slack net worth" measures the extent of slack on loans with a corresponding net worth financial covenant. It is equal to the borrower's net worth less the minimum level specified in the covenant, and normalized by the borrower's book assets. "Covenant slack tangible net worth" equals the borrower's tangible net worth less the minimum level specified in the covenant, and normalized by the borrower's book assets. "Covenant slack debt to tangible net worth" equals the minimum level specified in the covenant less the borrower's short and long-term debt ratio to tangible net worth. "Covenant slack interest coverage" equals the borrower's EBITDA ratio to interest expense less the minimum level specified in the covenant. The figures shown are equally-weighted averages of loans syndicated in a given year. The figures corresponding to financial covenant represent the fraction of loans that have financial covenants.
( (1) and (2) is an indicator for whether the loan has a financial covenant; the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the number of loan covenants; the dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) measures the slack on the borrower's net worth covenant for those loans with a net worth covenant. The explanatory variable of interest is the lead arranger's retained loan share at syndication. See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first regression of each set (columns (1), (3) and (5)) is OLS, while the second regression (columns (2), (4), and (6)) is the second stage of 2SLS, using the lending-limits to instrument the lead arranger's retained share. In addition to the characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, the syndicate, previous loan covenants, and a measure of cyclicality, all regressions include loan purpose dummies (corporate, acquisition, refinancing, and backup line), fine rating dummies (19 dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan from AA+ to CC and below), year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (1) and (2) measures the slack on the borrower's tangible net worth covenant for those loans with a tangible net worth covenant. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) measure the slack on the borrower's debt to tangible net worth covenant for loans with a debt to tangible net worth covenant. And the dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) measure the slack on the borrower's interest coverage covenant for loans with an interest coverage covenant. The first regression of each set (columns (1), (3) and (5)) is OLS, while the second regression (columns (2), (4), and (6)) is the second stage of 2SLS, using the lending-limits to instrument the lead arranger's retained share. All regressions include the covariates in the regressions included in Table 6 . Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (1) and (2) are at the loan deal-level while the regressions in columns (3) and (4) are for credit line facilities (the loan amount in these is the facility amount). The results presented are the second stage of the 2SLS where the two instruments used in the first stage are proxies for the lead arranger's internal lending limit; these are backed out from previous syndicated loans of the lead, both when it served as a lead arranger and when it served as a participant. In addition to the characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, and the syndicate, all regressions include loan purpose dummies (corporate, acquisition, refinancing, and backup line), fine rating dummies (19 dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan from AA+ to CC and below), year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Reciprocal
Industry rating upgrades, lead 1 year This table examines alternative measures of a lead arranger's exposure to a loan and alternative proxies for its lending limit. The results in column (1) define exposure as the log of the dollar size of the lead's loan share. The results in columns (2)-(4) define exposure by the lead's dollar loan amount relative to its capital. This measure is closer to how regulatory (and internal) lending limits are set in practice, but data on capital are only available for the subset of lead arrangers that are banks. The results in column (5) explore alternative proxies for a lead's lending limit. Instead of backing out lending limit measures from previous syndicated loans of the lead, lead fixed effects are directly used as instruments (based on the 1,055 lead arrangers). Finally, In addition to the characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, and the syndicate, all regressions include loan purpose dummies (corporate, acquisition, refinancing, and backup line), fine rating dummies (19 dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan from AA+ to CC and below), year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. This table examines the timing of default. In contrast to the main regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the borrower defaults in any year following the loan syndication, in these regressions default status applies to only the last loan taken out by the borrower before it defaults. In column (1) previous loans taken out by the borrower before its last loan are considered not to have defaulted, while these previous loans are excluded in the regression in column (2) . The regression in column (3) is the same as column (1) but also includes borrower firm fixed effects. Finally, In addition to the characteristics of the loan contract, the borrower, and the syndicate, all regressions include loan purpose dummies (corporate, acquisition, refinancing, and backup line), fine rating dummies (19 dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan from AA+ to CC and below), year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Industry default probability Industry default probability, lead 3 years Log (1+ previous loans) This table evaluates whether the lead arranger retaining a greater portion of the loan is more critical for opaque or poorly performing borrowers. Alternative measures of opacity include: borrowers with leveraged loans (these are loans priced at 125 basis points or more above LIBOR), borrowers that are in relatively less familiar industries (proxied for by the fraction of public firms that are in the borrower's 2-digit SIC industry in the year of loan origination based on Compustat data), borrowers with below median profitability, borrowers with below median Altman z-score, borrowers that are either subinvestment grade (below BBB-rating) or not rated, borrowers with higher equity volatility, borrowers with a higher bid-ask spread on their equity, and borrowers with more illiquid equity. Low refers to below the median, while High refers to above the median of the variable of interest. All regressions include the covariates in baseline regression, Table 2 column (3). In addition, the regressions in columns (3) and (4) include the measure of firms in same industry, regressions in column (7) and (8) include the Altman z-score, and regressions in columns (11) - (16) include equity volatility, equity bid-ask spread, and equity Amihud illiquidity measures. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subinvestment grade Equity volatility Equity bid-ask spread Equity Amihud illiquidity
Lead share
